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Abstract. We present the unique solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game.
We show the best result which can be reached when the game is played according to
Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. The result which we put forward does not surrender
the criticism of previous works on the same topic.
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1. Introduction
Theory of games concerns description of conflict situations between two or more
individuals, usually called players.
Besides classical theory of games for about 10 years has been a new field of investigation
- quantum games [4]. It represents an extension of traditional theory of games into
the field of quantum mechanics (quantum information). In quantum games players
have an access to strategies which are not encountered in the ‘macroscopic world’.
This phenomenon implicates new interesting results which may be attained by players
equipped with quantum strategies [2, 3, 4, 6 - 12].
1.1. Battle of the Sexes
The Battle of the Sexes is a static two-player game of nonzero sum whose matrix
representation is as follows:
q = 1 q = 0
Γ :
p = 1
p = 0
[
(α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)
]
where α > β > γ.
Characteristic for the Battle of the Sexes game are three Nash equilibria: one is found in
mixed strategies and the other two in pure strategies. The first player prefers equilibrium
(1, 1) which yields him the payoff α. In turn the second player, in order to get the payoff
α, prefers (0, 0). The problem of opposing expectations of the two players constitutes
definite dilemma. The players, following their preferences, may play strategy profile
(1, 0) that gives them the payoff γ - the least payoff in the game.
1.2. The model of quantum game
The quantum model of a two-player static game (the game in which each player chooses
their strategy once and the choices of all players are made simultaneously) is a family
(H, ρin, UA, UB,A,B) [3]. In such a model H is the underlying Hilbert space of the
physical system used to play a game and ρin is the initial state of this system. Sets
of strategies of two players are sets UA and UB of unitary operators by which players
can act on ρin. The symbols A and B mean the preference relation for the first
and the second player, respectively, which can be replaced by the payoff function. The
first scheme for playing quantum 2 × 2 game in which both players have an access to
‘quantum’ strategies appeared in [2]. In this model Hilbert spaceH is defined as C2⊗C2.
Players apply unitary operators acting on C2 which depend on two parameters. Their
strategies and the initial state ρin is taken to be a maximally entangled state of two
qubits. Marinatto and Weber [6] introduced a new scheme for quantizing 2× 2 games.
In contrary to the scheme proposed in [2], they restricted players actions to applying
identity operator I and Pauli operator σx or any probabilistic mixture of I and σx. This
limitation of unitary operators can lead to the situation in which the players are even
unable to state whether they play a game in classical or in quantum form [11]. For this
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reason Marinatto and Weber’s model seems to be the more natural way for quantizing
games. In the next section we give precise description of this scheme.
2. General Marinatto-Weber scheme
In the Marinatto-Weber scheme of playing 2×2 quantum games a space state of a game
is the 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional complex Hilbert space with a base (|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉). The
initial state of a game is |ψin〉 = a00|00〉+ a01|01〉+ a10|10〉+ a11|11〉 and I, C = σx are
unitary operators. Players are able to manipulate the initial state |ψin〉 by employing
I or C to the first and the second entry in the ket | · ·〉, respectively. According to the
idea of mixed strategies they can also apply, respectively, pI + (1− p)C, qI + (1− q)C.
If the language of density matrices is used then ρin = |ψin〉〈ψin| and the final state of
the game is as follows:
ρfin = pqI1 ⊗ I2ρinI1 ⊗ I2 + p(1− q)I1 ⊗ C2ρinI1 ⊗ C2
+(1− p)qC1 ⊗ I2ρinC1 ⊗ I2 + (1− p)(1− q)C1 ⊗ C2ρinC1 ⊗ C2
When the original classical game is defined by a bi-matrix:
q = 1 q = 0
Λ :
p = 1
p = 0
[
(x11, y11) (x12, y12)
(x21, y21) (x22, y22)
]
the payoff operators are:
PA = x11|00〉〈00|+ x12|01〉〈01|+ x21|10〉〈10|+ x22|11〉〈11|,
PB = y11|00〉〈00|+ y12|01〉〈01|+ y21|10〉〈10|+ y22|11〉〈11|.
The payoff functions πA and πB can then be obtained as mean values of the above
operators:
πA = Tr{PAρfin}, πB = Tr{PBρfin}
After applying the procedure discussed above, the quantum equivalent of the classical
game Λ is characterized by a two-dimensional bi-matrix ΛQ, the elements of which are
specified as a product of two matrices:
π(i, j) = ( |ai⊕21,j⊕21|2 |ai⊕21,j |2 |ai,j⊕21|2 |aij|2 )(X, Y ) (1)
where: π(i, j) = (πA(i, j), πB(i, j)), i, j ∈ {0, 1}, ⊕2 means addition modulo 2 and
(X, Y ) =
(
(x11, y11) (x12, y12) (x21, y21) (x22, y22)
)T
.
In the special case when |ψin〉 = |00〉 an equality Λ = ΛQ occurs.
3. Various attempts of solving the dilemma of the Quantum Battle of the
Sexes game
The history of efforts put into the quantum solution to the dilemma that unavoidably
occurs in the classical Battle of the Sexes began in [6], where the scheme of playing
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quantum games alternative to the scheme proposed in [2] was published. Marinatto and
Weber showed that the players who have an access to quantum strategies may gain the
same payoff in every equilibrium. If the initial state of the game is |ψ〉 = (|00〉+|11〉)/√2
then instead of (α, β) or (β, α), respectively, for strategy profiles (1, 1) and (0, 0), they
obtain ((α + β)/2, (α + β)/2)). Equalization of payoffs for players obtained in both
equilibria certainly eliminates differences between preferences of the players but, as
Benjamin [1] correctly stated, the dilemma still exists. Despite of the fact that both
players prefer two equilibrium situations to the same extent, there is still a possibility
that because of lack of communication between both players they may obtain the worst
payoff γ, which happens when they play combinations of strategies (1, 0) or (0, 1).
Further improvement in solving the dilemma of the Battle of the Sexes game was
presented by Nawaz and Toor in [8]. They improved the results of [6] considering
the quantum game Battle of the Sexes that begins with the initial state
|ψin〉 = (
√
5eiφ1 |00〉 + √5eiφ2 |01〉 + eiφ3 |10〉 + √5eiφ4 |11〉)/4 and showing that it is
equivalent to the classical game characterized by the following payoff bimatrix:
ΓNT = 1/16
[
(5α + 5β + 6γ, 5α+ 5β + 6γ) (5α+ β + 10γ, α+ 5β + 10γ)
(α + 5β + 10γ, 5α+ β + 10γ) (5α+ 5β + 6γ, 5α+ 5β + 6γ)
]
Then they argued that every player should choose their first strategy. It can be easily
observed that [8] improve results of [6]. For any α, β, γ where α > β > γ, it is better for
both players to play ‘Nawaz and Toor’s game’ than ‘Marinatto and Weber’s game’: in
[6], if players choose their strategies 1 or 0 at random, they gain with equal probability
(α+ β)/2 and γ, what gives them the expected value (α+ β + 2γ)/4 - the result which
is always worse than (5α + 5β + 6γ)/16. However, the question arises: is Nawaz and
Toor’s result the best result which players can guarantee themselves in the quantum
Battle of the Sexes game?
4. Harsanyi - Selten algorithm of equilibrium selection
The algorithm of choosing equilibrum presented below is described in a renowned book
by Nobel Prize winners Harsanyi and Selten [5]. Its aim is to select in each 2× 2 game
with two strong equilibria only one of them or the equilibrium in mixed strategies.
To demonstrate an operation of the algorithm let us consider the following 2× 2 game:
q = 1 q = 0
∆ =
p = 1
p = 0
[
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
and denote by u1 = a11−a21, v1 = a22−a12, u2 = b11− b12, v2 = b22− b21. Furthermore,
let us assume that the pairs of pure strategies (1, 1), (0, 0) form strong equilibria (ana-
logical criterion can be formulated for equilibria placed on the second diagonal). Then
there exists also the third equlibrium (s1, s2) in mixed strategies, where s1 = v2/(u2+v2),
s2 = v1/(u1 + v1).
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Algorithm: From three equilibria the one which dominates according to payoffs, i.e
the one, in which both players receive the largest payoffs should be chosen. If this is not
a case, then the equilibrium should be chosen according to the following formula:
(r1, r2) =


(1, 1), if u1u2 > v1v2
(0, 0), if u1u2 < v1v2
(s1, s2), if u1u2 = v1v2.
Such strategy pair is called as risk-dominant equilibrium [5].
It is important to notice that the given algorithm is not contradictory to individual
rationality. The algorithm should not be treated as an oracle which gives players un-
justified hints which are in conflict with common sense. The criterion entirely reflects
rational behavior of the players (see comments in [5]).
In order to see how this algorithm works, we apply it to the quantum version of the
game the Battle of the Sexes studied by Nawaz and Toor in [8] and described by the
payoff bi-matrix ΓNT .
It can be easily noticed that the game ΓNT has three equlibria but none of them is
dominant according to payoffs. Since u1 = u2 = 4(α − γ) and v1 = v2 = 4(β − γ), we
get u1u2 = 16(α−γ)2 > 16(β−γ)2 = v1v2. Therefore according to the rule given by the
Harsanyi and Selten’s algorithm, players should chose the equlibrium (1, 1) - a strategy
pair which also Nawaz and Toor consider as the only rational solution in this game.
5. Dilemma of the Battle of the Sexes overcome
In the previous section we presented the algorithm of equilibrium selection which should
be adapted by rational players for 2×2 games with two strong equilibria. The quantum
game begins when players receive initial state and at this stage there is a need to
define precisely its shape. Below-given lemma will allow one to use the Harsanyi-Selten
algorithm and also to equalize players’ preferences.
Let an initial state |ψin〉 = a00|00〉+a01|01〉+a10|10〉+a11|11〉 of a quantum 2×2 game
played according to the Marinatto-Weber scheme be given. Then the original classical
game Γ transforms into the game Γ′ such that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 5.1 If |a00|2 = |a11|2 = 12(1 − (ǫ1 + ǫ2)), |a01|2 = ǫ1, |a10|2 = ǫ2, where
ǫ1 + ǫ2 ≤ 1 − 2max{ǫ1, ǫ2} for ǫ1 6= ǫ2 and ǫ < 1/4 for ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ then for any
real numbers α > β > γ
a) a game Γ′ is identical to Γ with respect to strategy profiles which constitute Nash
equilibria in pure strategies and with respect to the number of equilibria,
b) payoff functions π′A, π
′
B of the quantum game Γ
′ fulfill the condition:
π′A(r1, r2) = π
′
B(r1, r2) for all equilibria (r1, r2) of the game Γ
′.
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Proof: Insert |a00|2 = |a11|2 = 12(1−(ǫ1+ǫ2)), |a01|2 = ǫ1, |a10|2 = ǫ2 to the formula (1).
Taking into account assumptions of the lemma about the sum ǫ1 + ǫ2 we obtain:
π′A(1, 1)− π′A(0, 1) = π′B(1, 1)− π′B(1, 0) =
(α− γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ2) + (β − γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ1) > 0. (2)
Similarly:
π′A(0, 0)− π′A(1, 0) = π′B(0, 0)− π′B(0, 1) =
(α− γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ1) + (β − γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ2) > 0. (3)
We infer from this results that pairs (1, 1), (0, 0) form Nash equilibria and none of the
strategies is weakly dominated. Therefore, the game Γ′ possesses also an equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
Furthermore, it can be easily observed that π′A(1, 1) = π
′
B(1, 1) = π
′
A(0, 0) = π
′
B(0, 0).
Let us mark by (s1, s2) the third equilibrium of the game Γ
′. Due to u1 = u2 and
v1 = v2, we obtain equality (s1, s2) = (s1, s1) = (s2, s2). Therefore, besides the equali-
ties: π′A(1, 0) = π
′
B(0, 1) and π
′
A(0, 1) = π
′
B(1, 0) we get π
′
A(s1, s2) = π
′
B(s1, s2).
The essential assumptions of the lemma are not condito sine qua non to fulfill the
thesis. Taking into consideration, for example, another initial state: |ψin〉 = a01|00〉 +
a00|01〉+ a11|10〉+ a10|11〉 one obtaines a game which is identical to Γ′ up to relabelling
of strategies of one of the players. Moreover, the assumption ǫ1 + ǫ2 ≤ 1− 2max{ǫ1, ǫ2}
can be weakened. The asumptions define form of the initial state for the quantum
Battle of the Sexes game with any α > β > γ. The necessary and sufficient condition
for inequalities (2) and (3) to be true require dependence of ǫ1 and ǫ2 on α, β and γ.
However for simplifying the results, we will not go into details of this problem. As we
will notice further the most important for our study are only values of (ǫ1, ǫ2) in the
neighborhood of (0, 0).
One of the characteristic features of both the classical game the Battle of the Sexes and
any of its quantum versions is the lack of any equilibria which are dominating according
to payoffs. However, the following theorem states that when assumptions of the lemma
are fulfilled, in quantum version of this game an risk-dominant equilibrium exists.
Theorem 5.2 If the quantum version Γ′ of the game Γ fulfills assumptions of the
lemma, then its risk-dominant equilibrium is the strategy profile:
(r1, r2) =


(1, 1), when ǫ1 > ǫ2
(0, 0), when ǫ1 < ǫ2
(1/2, 1/2), when ǫ1 = ǫ2.
(4)
Proof: Let us calculate u1u2, and v1v2 from the algorithm and estimate the difference
u1u2 − v1v2:
u1u2 =
[
(α− γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ2) + (β − γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ1)
]2
,
The Ultimate Solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game 7
v1v2 =
[
(α− γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ1) + (β − γ)(1
2
(1− (ǫ1 + ǫ2))− ǫ2)
]2
,
consequently:
u1u2 − v1v2 = (α + β − 2γ)(α− β)(1− 2(ǫ1 + ǫ2))(ǫ1 − ǫ2).
The first and the second element of the product is surely positive. Due to the assumption
of the lemma 1−2(ǫ1+ǫ2) is also positive. Therefore, the sign of the difference u1u2−v1v2
depends only on the sign of the difference ǫ1 − ǫ2.
In the case when ǫ1 = ǫ2 the game Γ
′ is characterized by the following equalities:
π′A(r1, r2) = π
′
B(r1, r2) for all (r1, r2)
π′(i, j) = π′(i⊕2 1, j ⊕2 1) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}
which implicate that Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is formed by a pair of strate-
gies (1/2, 1/2).
The initial state is known to the players, so according to the theorem it determines all
the development of the game. The values of payoff function corresponding to (4) are as
follows:
π′A,B(r1, r2) =


1
2
[(α+ β)− (α+ β − 2γ)(ǫ1 + ǫ2)] , when ǫ1 > ǫ2
1
2
[(α+ β)− (α+ β − 2γ)(ǫ1 + ǫ2)] , when ǫ1 < ǫ2
1
4
(α + β + 2γ)− 1
2
ǫγ, when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ.
Payoff function depends only on the values of ǫ1, ǫ2, thus it can be identified with
a function of two variables ǫ1 and ǫ2:
π′A,B(ǫ1, ǫ2) =
{
1
2
[(α + β)− (α+ β − 2γ)(ǫ1 + ǫ2)] , when ǫ1 6= ǫ2
1
4
(α + β + 2γ)− 1
2
ǫγ, when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ.
This function is composed of two linear functions with variables ǫ1, ǫ2. Let us examine
its limit:
lim
(ǫ1,ǫ2)→(0,0)+
π′A,B(ǫ1, ǫ2) =
{
1
2
(α + β), when ǫ1 6= ǫ2
1
4
(α + β + 2γ), when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ.
It follows, that:
sup
ǫ1,ǫ2
π′A,B(ǫ1, ǫ2) =
1
2
(α + β).
The maximum value of the function π′A,B(ǫ1, ǫ2) does not exist, but for any small positive
value δ an arbiter is able to prepare the initial state with sufficiently small ǫ1, ǫ2 that
are different from each other in such way that payoffs of players differ from 1
2
(α+β) less
than δ. This means that in the quantum Battle of the Sexes game both players may
obtain equal payoffs arbitrary close to 1
2
(α + β).
Example 5.3 If (α, β, γ) = (5, 3, 1), then according to the result of Nawaz and Toor
each player gets payoff 2, 875 while our formula yields for an initial state of the game
characterized by |a01|2 = ǫ1 = 0, 01, |a10|2 = ǫ2 = 0, 02 and |a00|2 = |a11|2 = 0, 485
payoffs [(5 + 3)− 0, 03(5 + 3− 2)]/2 = 3, 91.
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6. Conclusion
We obtained a new result in the quantum Battle of the Sexes game played according
to Marinatto-Weber scheme. In contrast to [6] we considered the initial state of the
game to be most general state of two qubits. We put conditions for amplitudes of
the initial state so that quantum form of the Battle of the Sexes game has identical
strategic positions of players as the initial game. Differently from [8], we did not
select a particular initial state, but we examined the dependence of players’ payoffs on
amplitudes of base states that form the initial state of the game. Our research showed
that the initial state |ψin〉 = a00|00〉+ a01|01〉+ a10|10〉+ a11|11〉 from [8] characterized
by |a00|2 = |a11|2 = |a01|2 = 5/16, |a10|2 = 1/16 is one of many initial states, which can
be prepare without lost characteristic feature of the classical Battle of the Sexes game.
Moreover, we discovered infinitely more initial states for which players can achive higher
payoffs than by means of Nawaz and Toor’s initial state. This allowed to determine the
supremum of the payoffs values. This quantum version assure that its participants can
get payoffs arbitrary close to the maximal payoff possible in the game: 1
2
(α+ β), which
is the highest value that can be obtained in the ‘classical’ game if and only if players
are allowed to communicate.
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